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Abstract
This paper contributes to the growing literature in macroeconomics and finance
on expectation formation and information processing by analyzing the relation-
ship between expectation formation at the individual level and the prediction of
macroeconomic aggregates. Using information from business tendency surveys
we present a new approach of analyzing qualitative forecasting errors made
by forecasters. Based on a quantal response approach with misclassification
we define qualitative mispredictions of forecasters in terms of deviations from
the qualitative rational expectation forecast and relate them to individual and
macro factors driving these mispredictions. Our approach permits a detailed
analysis of individual forecasting decisions allowing for the introduction of in-
dividual and economy wide determinants that affect the individual forecasting
error process.
JEL classification: C23, C25,D84, E27
Keywords: Expectations, Tendency Survey, Forecasting Errors, Misclassifica-
tion, GLARMA
1 Introduction
Expectation formation by economic agents is a key element of models in macroeco-
nomics and finance. Although the rational expectations assumption has served as the
dominant work horse in most models, the critique on this behavioral assumption is
as old as the rational expectations hypothesis itself. The recent literature in macroe-
conomics and finance emphasizes information rigidities and heterogeneity in informa-
tion processing by economic agents to explain observed deviations from theoretical
predictions based on models with homogeneous agents with rational expectations.
In particular models with partial (individuals only observe a noisy information sig-
nal, Woodford (2002), Sims (2010)) and delayed (only a share of individuals receives
up-to-date information, c.f. Calvo (1983), Mankiw & Reis (2002), Reis (2006a, b)
and Lorenzoni (2010)) information have been developed and provide more realistic
mechanisms for information processing. This paper takes a closer look on individ-
ual expectation formation and information processing by exploiting the informational
content of rich business tendency survey data on the basis of a novel approach of
dynamic misclassification.
The use of survey tendency data to analyze expectation formation has also a rather
long tradition in economics due to their relative simplicity and discreteness. Busi-
ness tendency surveys not only represent a timely source of information (Lui, Mitchell
& Weale (2010)) and perform reasonably well in predicting stock returns (Barberis,
Greenwood, Jin & Shleifer (2015)), or macro variables like inflation (Ang, Bekaert
& Wei (2007)), but also provide a good opportunity for empirical work on imperfect
information models (Mankiw & Reis (2010)). While pure time series approaches re-
quire some functional form assumptions on the expectation formation process, tests
of individual expectation formation on the basis of tendency survey data take the
directional forecasts of individuals for the comparison of predictions with realizations.
Therefore, no behavioral hypothesis on the expectation formation process has to be
imposed ex-ante. Moreover, the heterogeneity in beliefs and information sets can,
in principle, be accounted for due to the richness of the data in terms of their high
cross-sectional and time series dimension.
Traditionally, quantification methods like the probability method tracing back to An-
derson (1951) and Carlson & Parkin (1975) or regression methods (e.g. Pesaran 1984,
1985, 1987) were used to measure aggregate expectations on a continuous macro vari-
able at one point in time using j qualitative responses at the individual level. These ap-
proaches depend heavily on the aggregation rule (the quantification method), implicit
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homogeneity assumptions and identifying restrictions (e.g. assumptions on the thresh-
old parameters), so that a rejection of a certain expectation formation hypothesis may
always be the result of the underlying identification restrictions and aggregation rules.
Our new approach is based on a dynamic quantal response model with misclassifica-
tion. We use a generalized linear model with logistic link function with an ARMA
mean function (GLARMA) to model the individual misclassification probabilities.
Thus our approach generalizes previous cross-sectional misclassification approaches for
qualitative dependent variables (Hausman, Abreyava & Scott-Morton (1998), Haus-
man (2001), and Dustmann & van Soest (2004)) to a dynamic framework. The esti-
mate of this dynamic misclassification matrix allows us to interpret individual quali-
tative mispredictions in terms of deviations from the qualitative rational expectations
forecast and relate them to individual and macro factors driving these individual mis-
predictions.
Although looking at qualitative forecasts at the individual level we compare in our
approach j qualitative predictions with the corresponding qualitative macro outcome
at a given point in time. Through the introduction of a dynamic Markov type mis-
classification matrix our approach accounts for individual heterogeneity in forecasting
behavior. As such, our approach permits a detailed analysis of individual forecasting
decisions allowing for the introduction of individual and economy wide determinants
affecting the individual forecasting error process.
Like the early studies on expectation formation using tendency data our approach
is consistent with the rather general definition of expectations as subjectively held
beliefs by individuals. Special behavioral assumptions like rational expectations are
reflected in a special form of the misclassification matrix (see Gourieroux & Pradel
(1986)). Our model allows for the estimation of individual specific misclassification
matrices and due to the linearity between forecasts at the aggregate level and individ-
ual forecasts we can also aggregate the misclassification matrix to obtain a measure
for aggregate expectation errors in the sense of Pesaran & Weale (2006).
Our model is estimated with data from the Financial Markets Survey of the Centre
for European Economic Research (ZEW), a monthly qualitative survey of around 330
financial experts, giving six-month-ahead predictions of major macroeconomic aggre-
gates and financial indicators observed over 16 years. Contrary to the approaches
relying on aggregation rules, our discrete response approach allows us to exploit the
information on individual forecasting errors effectively. For Nt participants in the
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survey at time t the discretization of the macro series leaves us with
∑T
t=1 Nt forecast
comparisons at the micro level, while exploiting the continuous macro variable with
an aggregated continuous forecast (e.g. in the tradition of Carlson-Parkin) leaves us
with only T comparisons at the macro level. More concretely, in our empirical study
this leads to 300× 242 = 72600 individual forecasts comparisons compared to 242 at
the macro level and allows us to relate the individual forecast errors to the individual
characteristics of the forecasters. By using external survey information on the value
of thresholds separating the outcome space at the macro level implies a certain infor-
mation loss compared to the information contained in the continuous macro variable.
However, the identifying restrictions imposed are by far less severe compared to the
ones imposed by traditional quantification techniques relying e.g. on distributional
assumptions and symmetry, besides obtaining an easy to interpret matrix of misclas-
sification errors.
Our findings show that professional forecasters in our dataset are able to correct/revise
their mis-predictions in the long run but not in the short run. In this sense, this paper
also contributes to the literature on delayed information processing or the theory of
“inattentiveness”proposed by Reis (2006a, b), highlighting that individual forecasters
need time to process new information. New information is only progressively incorpo-
rated in their predictions. Moreover, this paper also contributes to the literature on
heterogeneity of expectations related to the dispersion of information, leading to the
so called “rational inattention” concept proposed by Sims (2003).
The outline of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we describe the data and the ZEW
financial market survey. In Section 3 we present the general modelling framework,
its econometric implementation and its estimation procedure. Section 4 discusses the
empirical findings. Section 5 presents a number of robustness checks, while Section 6
concludes and gives an outlook on further research.
2 Data
2.1 ZEW Financial Market Survey
Our empirical analysis is based on the ZEW Financial Market Survey which has been
conducted since December 1991 on a monthly basis and focuses on international fi-
nancial market series. Those include the financial markets in Germany, USA, Japan,
Great Britain, France, Italy, and since January 1999, the Euro-Area. Each month
representatives of the German financial sector employed in banks, insurance compa-
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nies or at finance departments or economic research departments in large industrial
corporations - therefore called experts - are polled on their expectations regarding the
developments in important international financial markets. From December 1991 to
January 2012, e.g. 242 months, 1086 experts responded at least once on the survey.
Since 1993 the number of participants is relatively stable, with around 300 experts
responding to the questionnaire each month.
Participants are asked to give their six-months-ahead predictions for the economic
activity, the inflation rate, the short and the long term interest rates, the exchange
rates, and the profits of 13 German industries (banking, insurance, vehicles construc-
tion, chemicals and pharmaceutical, steel/non-ferrous metals, electrical engineering,
mechanical engineering, consumer goods and retailing, construction, utilities, service
providers, telecommunications, information technology), as well as the oil price. Up
to November 1998, the exchange rate question relates to US-Dollar, Yen, UK-Pound
and Swiss Franc per Deutsche Mark (DM) and since December 1998 per Euro.
The ZEW Financial Markets Survey is a purely qualitative survey, meaning that the
respondents are asked to predict, whether in the next six months the price of the
corresponding “financial market series” will go up, stay the same, or go down. The
qualitative nature of the answers guarantees low costs of information collection and a
timeliness of the data. As the survey responses are first provided to the participants
attrition rates are low and missing values occur completely at random. A fourth pos-
sibility is to choose “no assessment”, if forecasters do not want or are unable to make
a prediction. Responses’ probabilities for this category are rather small (on average
less than 3 percent) and show no systematic correlations with the state of the macro
economy. This category will therefore be ignored. At the beginning each question-
naire had to be returned on the third Friday of a month, but since October 2001 it
changed to the second Friday of a month. The results of the questionnaire are pub-
lished each month in the ZEW Financial Market Report. It includes a detailed listing
of the changes in the percentages of the different response categories, as well as their
standard deviations, for the inflation rate, the short and long term interest rates, the
stock indices, the exchange rates, and the oil price. The ZEW Financial market report
receives a lot of attention in German and European media and is closely observed by
stock market investors.
Here we concentrate on 5 series asked with respect to Germany namely the inflation
rate, the short and long term interest rates, DAX30, and the USD/EUR exchange rate.
We decide to focus on 3 macro variables and 2 financial series in order to highlight
4
whether forecasters form their expectations differently for different economic variables.
The ZEW asked survey participants in a separate survey conducted in August 1997
about their up and down threshold values of their no-change interval for every fi-
nancial market series. The median threshold values are available to us and given
by (−0.002, 0.002) for inflation rate changes, (−0.2, 0.2) for both short and long
term interest rates changes, (−0.03, 0.035) for DAX30 returns and (−0.015, 0.015)
for USD/EUR exchange rate returns. Given that this additional survey was only car-
ried out once, we assume in the following that these thresholds are constant across
time and used by all survey participants.
2.2 Descriptive Figures
From the set of 1086 forecasters having responded during the life-time of the survey
(242 months) at least once, we have selected those who have answered the question-
naire at least 12 times and thus shown a minimum regular interest in the survey.
Altogether we end up with roughly 300 participants per month, from which about
10% each are experts from industry firms and insurance companies. The share of
managers returning the survey amounts to 15%. All of these figures remain relatively
stable over the lifetime of the survey. Despite the length of the sample period, the
response rates of the questionnaires are very high (see Figure 2 in Appendix A.1)
Figure 1 presents for the 5 variables under consideration the graphs of the shares for
up/same/down answered by the survey participants (sample probabilities) and the
graphs of the 6 months changes (inflation and interest rates) or the 6 months returns
(DAX 30 and USD/EUR), in the first two rows. In these graphs the “up” probability
share is always drawn in blue, the “same” probability share is always drawn in grey
and the “down” probability share is always drawn in yellow.
From a pure inspection of the (up/same/down) sample probabilities of the survey
participants (row 2), we see that for the inflation and the interest rate series the
group of experts seems to anticipate the changes of the underlying series very well.
For the DAX 30 and the USD/EUR series, however, this intuition is much less clear.
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3 Modelling Framework
3.1 General Model Specification
The basic idea for our model set-up relies on the definition of forecasts for the discrete
counterparts of a continuous macro variable based on different information sets at
the macro and at the micro level. We restrict our model set-up to models of expec-
tation formation which have a straightforward statistical formulation. However, the
framework can be easily generalized to models based on other behavioral assumptions.
Let Y ∗t be a continuous time series process at the macro level with t = 1, . . . , T and
define {Sk, k = 1, . . . , K} and {Gl, l = 1, . . . , L} as two given partitions (for the macro
and micro level, respectively) of the outcome space of Y ∗t . Let Yt be the discrete
counterpart of Y ∗t within a threshold crossing ordinal response model taking on the
form of the kth unit-vector for Y ∗t ∈ Sk, i.e., if Y
∗
t ∈ Sk the k
th component of Yt,
Yk,t, is equal to one, while all other components are equal to zero. Correspondingly
define for the second partition, Ỹt as the l
th unit-vector of dimension L indicating
that Y ∗t ∈ Gl. For example, if Y
∗
t denotes a first difference or a return rate series
possible partitions could be a two states partition (growth vs. no growth) or a three
states world (large growth rate above some positive threshold, weak growth around
zero called the “no-change” state, large negative growth rate below some negative
threshold). The distinction between two different partitions is reasonable for many
tendency data if the survey contains a no-change interval, while at the macro level
a reasonable partition could also be a binary one. Assume a forecasting horizon of
length h and a partition {Sk} and let Ft be the information set given at time t, then
for Yt+h there exists a K dimensional vector Pt+h with the typical element
Pr[Y ∗t+h ∈ Sk|Ft] = Pr[Yk,t+h = 1|Ft], (1)
that given the information set Ft the outcome Y
∗
t+h at time t + h lies in Sk. Since
E[Yk,t+h|Ft] = Pr[Yk,t+h = 1|Ft] the k-th element of Pt+h is the continuous rational
expectations forecast of state k in the sense of Gourieroux & Pradel (1986).
Consider now the same process forecasted by an individual forecaster i, i = 1, . . . , Nt,
where Nt denotes the number of participants in the survey at time t. Each forecaster
is assumed to make a qualitative assessment at time t about the development of the
macro variable Y ∗t+h. Pi,t+h denotes the L dimensional vector of probabilities
Pr[Y ∗t+h ∈ Gl|Fit] = Pr[Ỹl,t+h = 1|Fit], (2)
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that state l occurs in t + h given individual i-th information set Fit.
The forecasts at the micro level may differ because of different information sets Fit
(information disparity) but also because of different individual probability measures
(belief disparity). In principle, our setup allows for both kinds of disparities, but for
the ease of notation to cover the standard case of information disparity at the micro
level, we stick to the assumption of belief homogeneity.1
Expectations at the macro level, Pt+h, and expectations for forecaster i, Pi,t+h, are















The individual misclassification matrix, Π′i,t+h, defined in (3) relates the objective ex-
pectation formation process at the macro level2 to the individual (possibly subjective)
expectation formation process at the micro level. If Pt+h denotes the predictions of
the state indicator vector under rational expectations, the misclassification matrix
measures the deviation of a forecaster’s beliefs from the true data generating process.
For identical partitions Sk = Gk, K = L, the forecaster’s expectations are rational
in the sense of Muth (1961), if the misclassification matrix is the identity matrix,
Πi,t+h = IK . Moreover, at the macro level specific expectation formation schemes
such as static expectations, adaptive or error learning expectations can be imposed.
In this case the misclassification matrix can be used to measure deviations of the indi-
vidual forecaster’s beliefs from a given macroeconomic model world. For instance let
Pt+h be the probability forecasts for the exchange rate changes based on a purchasing
power parity model. In this case Πi,t+h measures the extent to which the beliefs of
forecaster i differ from the purchasing power parity hypothesis.
3.2 Average Expectations
Our approach allows for heterogeneous expectations, i.e. in the general set-up de-
veloped above Πi,t+h is individual specific (e.g. reflecting ability or experience of
1For both, informational disparity and disparity in beliefs Pr[Ỹl,t+h = 1|Fit] = Eit[Ỹl,t+h|Fit], where
Eit[·] indicates that the expectation is taken under the i-th forecasters (subjective) probability mea-
sure at t.
2We refer to objective expectations and objective probabilities as those implied by the (theoretical)
model on the macro level, see Muth (1961).
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forecaster i) as well as time specific (e.g. evolvement of macroeconomic uncertainty
over time). Pesaran & Weale (2006) propose the concept of average rational expecta-
tions in a model with heterogeneous expectations. This concept relies on the weighted
average of the individual conditional densities of the continuous macro variable to be
forecasted. Average expectations are consistent with the existence of heterogeneity in
beliefs and allow for systematic deviations from rational expectations at the individual










where the non-negative weights satisfy the conditions
∑Nt
























i,t+h. Let ut+h = Yt+h − Pt+h and ui,t+h = Yt+h − Pi,t+h be
the expectation error vector for the macro and the individual level respectively. The







Pt+h + ut+h. (6)
Aggregating over the number of forecasters in survey wave t gives the average expec-









Pt+h + ut+h. (7)
Under a set of sufficient conditions stated in Pesaran & Weale (2006), ūt+h
q.m.
−→ ut+h
for Nt → ∞, this implies IK = Π̄
′
t+h, so that average expectations equal rational
expectations. Using the average misclassification matrix Π̄′t+h we are able to test the
expectation formation in terms of a ’consensus’ or market concept. Note that Π′i,t+h
can be used to test for a specific expectation hypothesis at the individual level for
each forecaster separately in the sample. In this case Π̄′t+h can simply be regarded as
a summary statistic.
3.3 Estimation
Our model is estimated within a standard panel framework based on the individual
discrete forecasts for the change (return) of a given macro or financial series. We treat
the discrete forecasts at the individual level as misclassified values (mispredictions) of
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the macro forecasts. The outcome probabilities at the individual level can be expressed
as the sum of the misclassification matrix and the macro outcome probabilities. This

















πklit+h · Pt+h,k and Pt+h,k is the k-th element of Pt+h. In order to
facilitate the computation of the likelihood Pt+h,k is estimated in a first step. For the
elements of the misclassification matrix we choose a multinomial logistic form, where
the log-odds ratios of the misclassification probabilities follow a generalized Autore-
gressive Conditional Moving Average (ARMA) type process, detailed below.
For the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation of our model as outlined in (8), we need
to specify a model for the macro probability vector Pt+h for the discrete outcomes of
the macro series and a specification for the misclassification matrix Πit+h.
In the following we will concentrate on the case L = K = 3, i.e. a macro world with
K = 3 states (up/same/down) that matches the L = 3 answer categories asked for in
the ZEW survey. We set h = 6 which corresponds to the 6 months forecasting horizon
asked for in the ZEW survey.
3.4 Macro World Probabilities
We rely on a dynamic quantal response strategy to derive Pt+h at time t. We assume
the following time series specification for Y ∗t+h:
Y ∗t+h = µt+h + εt+h, (9)
where µt+h = E[Y
∗
t+h|Ft] denotes the conditional expectation of Y
∗
t+h given Ft. This
model is sufficiently general to incorporate standard expectation formation models,
such as static, adaptive or error learning specifications and also standard time se-
ries specifications such as ARMA models by choosing µt+h appropriately. The k
th









, for k = 1, 2, 3, (10)



















, for k = 1, 2, 3, (11)
where Φ denotes the standard normal c.d.f. and σt+h = E[σt+h|Ft], with σt the stan-
dard deviation of εt.
h-Step Ahead Forecast In our empirical study we obtain the forecasts P̂t+h by
estimating σt on the grounds of a six month realized volatility estimator using weekly
observations and we use, following the definition of Marcellino, Stock &Watson (2006),
a direct AR(4) forecasting models for σt+h and Y
∗
t+h to obtain the forecasted variables
σ̂t+h and Ŷ
∗
t+h at time t. We use expanding window regression with data dating back
to January 1974 to obtain the parameter estimates for the direct AR(4) models.
The Perfect Forecast Case For comparison reasons and to rule out forecasting
model uncertainty caused by the use of a potentially misspecified forecasting model
we also consider the following perfect forecast case under which we assume that we
know the realizations of σt+h and Y
∗
t+h already at time t. Hence, we obtain P̂t+h by




t+h. Also in this cas,e σt is obtained by a six month
realized volatility estimator using weekly observations.
For both cases and for each series analyzed, we use the ZEW’s constant median up and
down threshold values detailed in section 2 in (11) to determine the (up/same/down)
partition of the respective macro series. This dynamic quantal response forecasting
strategy should be understood as a starting point for the prediction of P̂t+h. An
alternative strategy consist of deriving the probability vector P̂t+h by dynamic quantile
regression based forecasts of Y ∗t+h, in which the respective quantiles, which then yield
P̂t+h, are chosen to match the up and down thresholds. A further possibility consists
of transforming Y ∗t with the help of the threshold series into their discrete counterparts
Yt and to forecast P̂t+h directly with the discrete information using for example an
Autoregressive Conditional Multinomial (ACM) model of Russell & Engle (2005).
3.5 Misclassification Matrix










Thus πkli,t+h is the probability that a participant i gives the assessment l although the
true assessment should have been k, for k, l = 1, 2, 3, l 6= k. The probability that the
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assessment of the participant is correct, i.e., that no misclassification occurs, is then




i,t+h is equal to one by definition (adding-up
constraint).
Similar to Russell & Engle (2005) for their autoregressive multinomial model (ACM)







, k, l = 1, 2, 3, (13)
where the log-odds ratio Λkli,t+h will be specified in terms of an autoregressive form
as given below. As normalization constraint, we use as the reference category the
corresponding correct macro outcome category, i.e. Λkki,t+h = 0 for k = l, such that the
odds ratios are defined as the quotient of a given misclassification probability to the





















, for k, l, l′ = 1, 2, 3, and k 6= l 6= l′ , (14)
is specified as a multivariate ARMA type process, including explanatory variables.
All in all the log odds ratios in (14) define nine misclassification probabilities for the
three true states of the world. Due to the three adding-up constraints there are two
log-odds ratio to be estimated for each of the true states of the world. For the vector
log-odds ratios we assume the following linear autoregressive form:
Λki,t+h = c
k +GZi,t+h + A
kξi,t+h−1 ∀k = 1, 2, 3, (15)
with Ak being a matrix of dimension (2× 3) with the elements {akll′}, for l, l
′ = 1, 2, 3
with l 6= k. ck denotes the (2 × 1) vector of constants ck = (ckl , c
k
l′)
′, for l, l′ 6= k.
Zi,t+h denotes the g-dimensional vector of explanatory variables which are time and/or
individual specific and are included statically with G as the corresponding coefficient
matrix of dimension (2×g). The misclassification indicator vector driving the ARMA
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(1l {Ỹ1,t+h|Fit=1}
+ 1l {Ỹ3,t+h|Fit=1}
) · 1l {Y2,t+h=1}
(1l {Ỹ1,t+h|Fit=1}
+ 1l {Ỹ2,t+h|Fit=1}







which is the three-dimensional state vector of individual i at time t + h representing
whether that individual misclassified at time t the true change of the underlying vari-
able. For example, if ξi,t+h = (1, 0, 0)
′ then individual i predicted either a no change or
a negative change of the variable at time t, although in reality the variable went up in
the period from t to t+h. Hence, negative coefficients in Ak imply lower values in the
corresponding log-odds ratio vector Λki,t+h and thus a learning effect, positive coeffi-
cients imply a more pronounced degree of misclassification, while mixed sign patterns
of the coefficients do not allow for a clear statement about the learning effect just by
examination of the signs of the coefficients.
Note that in our empirical study we employ ACM specifications with one lag, and use
the same set of explanatory variables for each state k and assume that the coefficient
matrices are equal across states, i.e. G = G1 = G2 = G3, so that the corresponding
coefficients reflect the general impact of the explanatory variables on misclassification.
The specification can be easily generalized to include more lags and different coefficient
matrices for the explanatory variables for each state.
3.6 Definition of Explanatory Variables
Our set of explanatory variables can be divided in two classes: purely individual spe-
cific and both, time and individual specific variables. We specify four individual spe-
cific explanatory variables, namely Insurancei, Industryi, Manageri and Reliabilityi.
Since our group of experts consists of experts from banks, insurance and industry
companies we include dummy variables to figure out whether experts from particular
groups have different abilities in forecasting the underlying series. Thus, we generate
the dummy variables Insurancei and Industryi to be equal to 1 if individual i is a
representative of an insurance or industry firm, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Hence,
the group of bankers forms the basis category. The dummy variable Manageri is equal
to 1 if individual i belongs to the management board and 0 otherwise and thus mea-
sures the forecasting ability of managers over the other groups of experts working
in economic, security analysts, asset management or financial accounting divisions.
Reliabilityi is defined as the share of the number of questionnaires returned in time
over the overall returned number of questionnaires for each individual i. This explana-
tory variable allows us to characterize the general degree of punctuality or reliability
of each participant, which we assume to be an overall characteristic of a forecaster
and time independent.
In contrast Performanceit is a time and individual specific variable defined as the share
12

















1l {1l {Ỹk,t−τ |Fit−h−τ =1}
=1l {Yk,t−τ |Ft−h−τ =1}
}.
This variable captures the effect of the historical forecasting performance of each par-
ticipant on their future assessments. This variable allows us to examine a general
individual specific long term learning process, while the misclassification indicator pa-
rameters ξki,t+h reflect a short term error learning process with respect to specific states
of the world, here k = 1, 2, 3 (up/same/down).
Note, that all explanatory variables have positive domains so that their influence
on the vector of log-odds ratios and thus on the degree of misclassification can be
interpreted in a straightforward way. A positive coefficient implies higher values for
the components in the vector of log-odds ratios and hence reflects a higher degree of
misclassification, since by construction for every state k the basis category corresponds
to the “correct prediction” category.
4 Empirical Findings
4.1 Descriptive Figures
In Figure 1 below we present for the 5 variables under consideration the 6 months
standard deviation estimated with a realized volatility estimator (row 3), as well as
the objective probabilities of up/same/down for both the perfect forecast (row 4) and
the 6 months ahead forecasting scenarios (row 5). In these graphs the up probability
share is always drawn in blue, the same probability share is always drawn in grey and
the down probability share is always drawn in yellow.
Whereas the perfect forecast case objective probabilities mimic the behavior of the
series very closely (row 3), the objective probabilities from the 6 months ahead fore-
casting scenario (row 4) do anticipate their general behavior also quite well but to a
less amplified extent and with variations only in a narrow band above stable baseline
shares. This is of course due to the specific forecasting setup for probabilities that adds
additional forecasting uncertainty and thus cloaked the true changes of the underlying
series. The perfect forecast probabilities, in contrast, rule out any forecasting model
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uncertainty and constitute the limiting case in that respect that we assume that at
time t we already know the return (and its standard deviation) of the particular series
from t to t+ 6.
Under the assumption of (average) rational expectations these sample probabilities
should correspond on average to the above discussed forecasted objective probabilities.
However, we observe a certain degree of discrepancies between the sample and the
objective probabilities yielding a specific amount of misclassification that we analyze
within the proposed modeling framework.
4.2 Estimation Results
In Table 1 we present for both macro probability scenarios the estimation results for
the explanatory variables included in the ACM misclassification regressions for the 5
variables under consideration. The detailed estimation outputs (Tables 5 and 6) can
be found in Appendix A.2.
A first important finding is that for the perfect forecast and the 6 months ahead
forecasting scenarios we find no general qualitative differences in the effects of the
explanatory variables on the degree of misclassification which implies a certain ro-
bustness of the results with regard to the choice of the specific forecasting model for
the 6 months ahead prediction of the macro up/same/down probabilities.
Our first main results show that individuals learn in the long term but not necessar-
ily in the short term. Except for the long term interest rates in the perfect forecast
scenario, where the coefficient is positively significant, we find that for all 5 series
the effect of past prediction performance, which measures the degree of correct fore-
casts over the last 12 months, has a significant negative impact in both scenarios
on the degree of misclassification implying a significant link between better historical
prediction performance and more accurate future forecasting ability of individual i.
Hence, we observe that those forecasters who have given a better assessment in the
past do continue to do so also in the future. They reveal a sharpened understanding
of the data generating process, may be better informed or may have access to better
resources in making their predictions especially in the long run. This finding also
allows an interpretation as a general long term learning of individual i through the
performance variable, in the sense that the individual forecaster learns from his past
long run mistakes how to make more accurate forecasts which then imply increasing
shares of correct predictions and thus less misclassification of future forecasts.
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Inflation Rate Short term interest rate Long term interest rate DAX USD/EUR
Figure 1: The first row displays the shares for up/same/down (in blue/grey/yellow) answered by the survey participants (sample
probabilities) for the inflation and interest rates as well as the DAX 30 and USD/EUR, the second row displays the graphs of the 6 months
changes (inflation and interest rates) or the 6 months returns (DAX 30 and USD/EUR) of the actual series. The third row shows the 6 months
standard deviation estimated with a realized volatility estimator. The objective probabilities of up/same/down for the perfect forecast, resp.
for the 6 months ahead forecasting scenarios can be found in the fourth and the fifth rows (resp.).
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Short-term Learning
The effect of only the last mis-prediction and short term learning can be examined by
looking at the coefficients in the Ak innovation term matrices of the ACM model. It is,
however, less clear cut and we generally do not observe a uniform sign pattern across
coefficients. An interesting finding is that for both scenarios we observe for the DAX30
that the A3 matrices have significant positive coefficients, implying that forecasters
do not learn from short term past mis-prediction when these financial series are in a
downward move. Moreover, they neither seem to learn when this series is in an upward
move in a perfect forecast scenario. These results show on the contrary that their de-
gree of mis-prediction is accelerated. To some extent this can be related to the concept
of “trend following” proposed by Barberis et al. (2015). They provide evidence that
many stock market investors exhibit a kind of “trend following behaviour” in the sense
that they form their predictions of future stock market returns based on past returns,
meaning that they expect the stock market to perform well in the near future if it has
recently performed well and vice versa. The professional forecasters we consider in
our dataset may also follow past trends to form their beliefs/expectations about the
future, and therefore they are unable to revise their predictions so rapidly to follow
up and down movements. Additionally these results can be either related to bubbles
observed for these series or be attributed to an optimism bias.3 If we take a closer
look at the graphics in the third row in Figure 1 for the DAX30, which represents the
shares of up/same/down answered by the survey participants (sample probabilities),
we see that approximately 60% of the participants always predict that the price of
the DAX30 in the next 6 months will go up. This suggests that the participants are
most of the time optimistic concerning the assessment of the 6 month ahead forecast
of the DAX30, and might confirm the exhibition of an optimistic bias.
For the USD/EUR series and the short term interest rate respectively, we observe a
similar but less pronounced effect for the upward state matrices A1, for the downward
state matrices A3respectively. On the contrary, we see that for the inflation series
the A1 matrix has significant negative coefficients, implying that forecasters do learn
from short term past mis-prediction if this macro series is in an upward move.4 All
results shed more light on the time horizon in learning and contradict to a certain
3Optimism bias is the tendency for people to over-estimate the likelihood of positive events and
under-estimate the likelihood of negative events. See Weinstein (1980), among others.
4This is in line with Ang et al. (2007), who provide evidence that survey data can predict future
inflation.
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extent previous findings in the literature. Many observations from psychology, po-
litical science, and organizational behavior indicate that people exhibit a taste for
consistency. Meyvis, Ratner & Levav (2010) show that people are unable to recognize
their forecasting error, due to the fact that they exhibit a tendency to recall their
affective forecast to be in conformity with their actual experience. In this respect,
they do not revise their beliefs and continue to rely on the same incorrect beliefs for
their subsequent forecasts, so that they are unable to learn from past mis-predictions.
This is in line with the findings of Wilson, Meyers & Gilbert (2001) and Fischhoff
(1975) that people erroneously remember their past predictions.
Long-term Learning
Our observation that individuals tend to learn from their past long term mistakes
(through the Performanceit variable) but not from the short ones (specification of
the error terms) is in contrast more consistent with the information processing mech-
anism put forward in relatively new macroeconomic models. Calvo (1983), Mankiw
& Reis (2002), Lorenzoni (2010) and Mankiw & Reis (2010) among others developed
so called delayed information processing models in which only a share of individuals
receives up-to-date information to provide more realistic mechanisms for information
processing, whereas Woodford (2002) and Sims (2010) introduced models with partial
information processing in which individuals only observe a noisy information signal.
Our result, that professional forecasters are able to correct/revise their mis-predictions
in the long run but not in the short run is also related to the theory of “inattentiveness”
proposed by Reis (2006a,b), highlighting that individual forecasters need time to pro-
cess new information, and that new information is only progressively incorporated
in their predictions, due to their limitations in acquiring and processing information
(Coibion & Gorodnichenko (2012)). This result is also supported by Andrade & LeBi-
han (2013) who show that participants of the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters
fail to update systematically their forecasts as a result of new information disclosure,
and that they differ in their frequency of updating.
Heterogeneity among Forecasters
Our second set of results show that heterogeneity among forecasters matters. Interest-
ingly, we find that in cases where the reliability variable is significantly different from
zero, it is always positive implying that those forecasters who are more painstaking
in returning the questionnaire in time do not necessarily provide better forecasts. For
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the DAX30 in both scenarios this result can be again related to the fact that 60%
of the participants always predict that the price will go up. This result can in addi-
tion also find support in the delayed information processing models literature (Calvo
(1983), Mankiw & Reis (2002), Lorenzoni (2010) and Mankiw & Reis (2010)). Those
professional forecasters who delay the returning of the questionnaire have practically
more time to process the available information, such that delaying the return of the
questionnaire then plays in their favor. They take more time, and consequently make
less mistakes and more accurate predictions.5
We find that experts from insurance and industry firms seem to generate a higher
degree of misclassification (if significant the respective dummy variable coefficients
are positive except for one case) which might be explained by less resources and in-
formation and by the fact that they might face a further distance in their day-to-day
business to the variables of interest and thus have less experience with these variables
than their colleagues from banks. A similar finding can be made with respect to the
coefficient of the manager dummy variable which is if significant always positive (ex-
cept for one case the USD/EUR series) which might also reflect a less time and effort
effect. Recent literature on “rational inattention” (Sims 2010, 2003) suggests that
heterogeneity of expectations/believes is related to dispersion of information.6 Our
results shed, indeed, light on the heterogeneity of the forecasts between two groups:
the bankers and the others, and their “rational inattention”. Bankers can be con-
sidered as being more “attentive” than the other group and therefore generate less
misclassification/mis-predictions than managers, and experts from insurance and in-
dustry firms. This shows that the latter may have only partial information or so called
“rational inattention”, given that their day-to-day business is less related to the macro
and financial variables of interest in this study. Alternative explanations given in the
literature suggest that domain knowledge and experience improves forecast accuracy
(Harvey, Bolger & McClelland (1994)). Stickel (1992) analyzes the performance of
5Nevertheless, this result contradicts to a certain extent the literature investigating the relationship
between conscientiousness and job success. Several psychological studies, indeed, have shown that
conscientiousness is highly positively correlated with job success (e.g. Barrick & Mount (1991) and
Robertson & Kinder (1993)), in the sense that employees having a higher interest in their job, and
therefore have a higher degree of conscientiousness, are more successful.
6Nevertheless, Patton & Timmermann (2010) come to a kind of opposite result in their study. Patton
& Timmermann (2010) indeed, show in their empirical analysis of cross-sectional dispersion in fore-
casters’ predictions of macroeconomic variables that heterogeneity in forecasters’ information sets
does not play a major role in explaining the cross-sectional dispersion in predictions of macroeco-
nomic variables. Their result suggests that differences in predictions/believes cannot be explained
by differences in information sets.
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security analysts on the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team relative
to the performance of other analysts. He shows that the members of this team are
more accurate in forecasting earnings, and forecast more frequently than other ana-
lysts, suggesting that experience has a positive impact on forecasting ability. In an
experiment, where information is cumulatively distributed among traders, meaning
that some investors know more than others by having the same plus some extra infor-
mation, Huber, Kirchler & Sutter (2008) address the question whether having more
information than others about the intrinsic value of an asset always leads to higher
returns when trading in financial markets. They show that only the best informed
traders outperform the less informed ones. In the same manner, Ackert, Church &
Zhang (2002) show that well informed traders are able to exploit their informational
advantage to outperform less informed ones. Those papers support our result that
bankers may possess extra information that enable them to make a better assessment
about the future development of the financial variables than experts from insurance
and industry firms.
Finally our last results show that the predictions are not consistent with average
rational expectations. Table 2 contains the mean misclassification matrices Π̃, and we
observe that all matrices differ from the identity matrix7, which clearly shows that
forecasters reveal a prediction behavior which is not consistent with average rational
expectations.
5 Robustness Check
In this section we present some robustness checks to assess the credibility of our re-
sults. We previously found no general qualitative differences in the effects of the
explanatory variables on the degree of misclassification between the perfect forecast
and the 6 months ahead forecasting scenarios, and that is why we solely focus on the
6 months ahead forecasting scenario in this section.
We split our sample period into crisis/turmoil periods and non crisis periods, in order
to detect a difference in the forecasting behaviour of our professional forecasters. Here
we are considering 5 periods of turmoil, namely the European Currency Crisis8 from
April 1992 to June 1993, which peaked on the 16th September 1992, also called “Black
7We defined previously in Section 3 that the forecaster’s’ expectations are rational in the sense of
Muth (1961), if the misclassification matrix is the identity matrix, Πi,t+h = IK .
8It reflects the withdraw of the UK and Italy from the European Monetary System.
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6 months ahead forecasting scenario
Short Term Long Term
Inflation Interest Rate Interest Rate DAX USD/EUR
Variable Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
Insurancei -0.0130 -0.1929 -0.0382 -0.5512 -0.0017 -0.0162 0.2473 3.4395 0.3018 4.0894
Industryi 0.0518 0.6174 -0.1987 -1.5807 0.5528 4.4048 0.9237 10.1283 -0.0374 -0.4207
Manageri -0.0769 -1.1210 0.1261 1.5626 0.0619 0.7651 0.1549 1.9657 -0.1706 -2.7296
Reliabilityi 0.0225 0.1623 0.4594 2.7248 -0.2700 -1.3595 1.1797 6.9640 -0.2141 -1.4012
Performanceit -1.5250 -61.9919 -0.5405 -32.1726 -1.5109 -25.4360 -3.4863 -50.8207 -1.9912 -46.8518
perfect forecast scenario
Short Term Long Term
Inflation Interest Rate Interest Rate DAX USD/EUR
Variable Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat Est. t-stat
Insurancei 0.0529 1.3634 0.0211 0.6394 -0.1311 -2.9795 0.1655 4.2219 0.0858 2.5385
Industryi 0.3895 8.9540 0.0454 0.9458 0.3768 5.5493 0.4560 9.2683 0.0706 1.4379
Manageri 0.0938 2.4947 0.1272 3.4102 -0.0804 -1.8483 0.0408 0.9358 0.0035 0.0895
Reliabilityi 0.3019 4.1470 0.0005 0.0076 0.3562 3.2799 0.7057 7.2528 0.1576 1.9267
Performanceit -0.2689 -19.6277 -0.0870 -10.6098 1.2670 64.6429 -1.4607 -93.0382 -0.3850 -27.1127
Table 1: Estimation results for the covariates in the misclassification probability for inflation rate, short term interest rate, long term
interest rate, DAX and USD/EUR FX-rate
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6 months ahead forecasting scenario
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Table 2: Mean misclassification matrices Π̃ for the 6 months ahead forecasting and the perfect foresight scenario inflation rate, short
and long term interest rate, DAX and USD/EUR FX-rate. ACM parameter estimates of the coefficient matrix G given by Equation
(15).
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Wednesday”, the Mexican Economic Crisis9 in 1994, the Russian financial crisis10 in
1998, the burst of the Dot-Com Bubble from March 2000 to October 2002, and the
recent financial crisis from August 2007 to February 2009. This set-up will help us to
analyse the forecasting behaviour more specifically during these particular periods.
We construct a measure of the degree of misclassification computed as being the sum of
the elements of the squared differences between the estimated misclassification matrix
and the identity matrix at every point in time. The closer the value of this measure
is to 0, the more the professional forecasters form their expectations rationally on
average. We then compute the correlation between the price changes/returns and the
inverse of the misclassification measure for each series under consideration.
Table 4 shows the mean misclassification matrices for the 6 months ahead forecasting
scenario of all variables during crisis and non crisis periods, while Table 3 presents
the correlation coefficients between price changes/returns and the inverse of the mis-
classification measure during the two sub periods. Altogether we consider 90 months
of crisis and 152 of calm periods. We observe that the correlations are, when signifi-
cant, always negative during non-crisis periods, suggesting that during those quieter
periods more misclassification is generated, so that forecasters seem to deviate more
from the rational expectations hypothesis on average. However, the result is less clear
cut during crisis periods. We observe for both financial series a significant negative
correlation. This implies that forecasters misclassify more during crisis periods, and
that is why they deviate more from the rational expectation hypothesis; a phenomena
also observed by examining the average estimated misclassification matrices in Table
4. On the opposite, we observe a significant positive correlation for short term inter-
est rates, suggesting that our forecasters deviate less from the rational expectation
hypothesis during crisis periods for that macro variable. This result sheds light on the
fact that our forecasters form their expectations differently depending on the nature
of the variable they are asked to predict and the overall economic climate.
Overall, we observe more misclassification during non-crisis periods regardless of the
variable under consideration (the correlations are always negative). Whereas this re-
sult holds for the financial variables during crisis periods, it reverses for the short term
interest rate. One could argue, that there is more homogeneous information available
9The Mexican Economic Crisis saw the devaluation of the Mexican Peso, with a bailout mostly funded
by the US
10It resulted in the Russian government and the Russian Central Bank devaluing the ruble and de-
faulting on its debt.
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for macro variables, so that during crisis periods forecasters are more focused, and
interpret this homogeneous information in the same way, and therefore generate less
mis-predictions. On the opposite, given the easy access to information about financial
markets, and given the fact that this information is highly dispersed and heteroge-
neous, forecasters have more difficulties to come up with a consensus during crisis
periods, and therefore this situation leads to more misclassification, i.e. they deviate
more from the rational expectation hypothesis.
crisis periods
Short Term Long Term
Inflation Interest Rate Interest Rate DAX USD/EUR
-0.1784 0.5106∗∗∗ -0.2717 -0.3961∗∗ -0.0808∗
non crisis periods
-0.5225∗∗∗ -0.4203∗∗∗ -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.0394∗∗ 0.0574
Table 3: Correlation coefficients between the returns and the misclassification
measure for the two sub-samples. To test the significance of the correlation co-
efficients, we performed a rank correlation test. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote that the
coefficient is statistically significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
significance level respectively
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we present a new empirical approach to analyse individual expecta-
tion formation processes based on tendency survey data. Using a dynamic quantal
response model with misclassification we define qualitative mispredictions in terms
of deviations from the qualitative rational expectation forecast and relate them to
individual and macro factors driving these individual mispredictions. Our approach is
consistent with the rather general definition of expectations as subjectively held beliefs
by individuals. Since individual expectations are taken from individuals’ qualitative
responses to survey questions, no assumption on the individual expectation formation
process is necessary. In this sense our approach is double robust. First, it is robust
against the critique of classical tests of the rational expectation hypothesis based on
aggregate time series data which require distributional and/or functional form as-
sumptions. Second, the approach does not require an aggregation rule by considering
individual forecasts at any time period with the equivalent outcome at the macro level.
Our results show that surveys are useful to predict macro-variables, as already men-
tioned in Ang et al. (2007), and represent a timely source of information (Lui et al.
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Table 4: Mean misclassification matrices Π̃ for the 6 months ahead forecasting scenario for the inflation rate, short and long term
interest rate, DAX and USD/EUR FX-rate during crisis and non crisis periods.
24
(2010)). For all series (inflation rate, short and long term interest rate, DAX30, and
the USD/EUR exchange rate with respect to Germany) considered, we find a specific
learning pattern. We observe a general long term learning effect, reflected by the fact
that forecasters who gave a better assessment in the past continue to do so in the
future, whereas we do not observe a general short term learning effect. Furthermore,
we observe for the DAX30 series that the forecasters do not learn from short term past
misprediction if these financial series are in a downward move but rather accelerate
their degree of misprediction. For the USD/EUR series and the short term interest
rate respectively, we observe a similar but less pronounced effect for upward state, and
for the downward state respectively. Forecasters who are more reliable in returning
the questionnaire in time do not provide better forecasts. Managers, experts from in-
surance and industry firms seem to generate a higher degree of misclassification than
bankers, indicating that better informed participants outperform the less informed
ones.
The estimation of the misclassification matrix allows us not only to systematically
analyse forecasting behavior at the individual level, but also in terms of average fore-
casts for specific groups of forecasters or the overall group of survey respondents. Our
results suggest that our forecasters form their expectations differently depending on
the variables they are predicting. Because the underlying time series are reasonably
long, estimates of certain subperiods were used for a systematic analysis of individual
forecasting behavior in different scenarios (crisis times vs calm times). More mis-
classification was observed during non-crisis periods regardless of the variable under
consideration as well as for the financial variables during crisis periods. We found less
misclassification for the short term interest rate during crisis periods. These findings
suggest that forecasters might have asymmetric or different loss functions
In future research our approach can be used to test specific expectation hypothe-
ses or learning algorithms. Moreover, the degree of homogeneity of the individual
misclassification matrices could also be used as a simple measure of the degree of con-
sensus among forecasters. Although the goal of our study is to develop an econometric
method to detect the sources of directional forecasting errors rather than developing
another forecasting method, our approach can be used to improve forecasts based
on individual forecasts. For instance our estimates can be used to construct sub-
samples of superior forecasters to improve the overall forecasting performance of the
survey data. Moreover, by computing a reverse misclassification matrix in the spirit of
time-reversible Markov chains it would be possible to exploit the information on mis-
classifications systematically to obtain misclassification corrected tendency forecasts.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the response rate across experts.
The response rate for each expert is computed as the number of




inflation short term long term DAX USD/EUR
interest rate interest rate




0.1916 10.8864 -1.5506 -119.2769 0.0691 2.4504 -0.8988 -11.1652 -2.2111 -101.4266
c13 -1.1169 -33.7432 -4.8696 -125.1825 -2.1717 -72.1495 -1.3781 -19.3553 -3.3579 -170.4518
c2
1
4.4144 35.8312 -1.9272 -87.6000 -4.3394 -30.2819 2.8853 9.1918 5.1416 0.4347
c2
3
2.0086 36.2563 0.2907 20.0483 4.1956 24.0436 -1.3275 -4.3269 -0.0728 -0.0032
c3
1
-2.7614 -103.8120 -1.6294 -95.2865 0.3389 21.0497 1.2349 29.1250 -3.2590 -152.2897
c3
2
-1.4682 -74.9082 -0.5235 -48.0275 0.6595 25.1718 0.4150 6.1209 0.0650 2.7778
a1
21
-1.5333 -58.5229 0.6013 43.2590 0.6043 13.4888 1.2266 6.4626 3.0495 65.4399
a131 -2.4668 -39.0935 -0.4384 -3.0110 3.2440 94.5773 0.8304 5.1228 5.4364 188.1107
a1
22
-2.6326 -77.4294 5.5720 170.3976 -0.5167 -9.1290 1.0057 9.3380 2.1208 60.4217
a132 -6.6444 -57.6271 9.3487 134.1277 0.7952 12.7029 0.7804 7.5183 3.9075 174.4420
a1
23
-0.9652 -45.1028 8.2725 188.8699 0.2267 6.2110 0.5060 5.4176 2.8647 93.3127
a133 -1.1866 -22.4310 7.3165 45.6425 1.5819 38.8673 0.3734 4.2097 3.7412 157.1933
a2
11
-7.0258 -38.6245 1.1316 38.2297 21.6073 9.9573 -6.2898 -6.7163 12.4827 0.1151
a231 -19.5392 -3.6328 -6.8375 -137.2992 -12.7806 -3.7167 5.8418 7.7932 -11.8902 -0.0159
a2
12
-20.5203 -53.6619 1.8007 53.4332 6.9608 29.6709 0.7750 0.6654 -8.3229 -0.3199
a232 -30.3038 -5.7227 -10.4772 -74.8906 -8.9927 -27.2671 4.6943 4.3166 8.3811 0.2190
a2
13
-44.1393 -18.2183 3.0537 57.9450 5.9565 35.4132 -0.4187 -1.0002 -14.5468 -0.1952
a233 -6.4510 -51.2798 -3.9391 -46.5615 -4.9208 -20.4692 -0.7220 -0.4670 20.7472 0.2480
a3
11
2.1871 58.0133 1.7246 94.2404 -0.1916 -12.6053 4.1867 27.1687 2.0869 59.9684
a321 1.0521 41.0977 1.1294 110.7255 -0.2828 -8.5438 3.9334 16.3009 -0.3077 -9.2402
a3
12
0.0650 1.7016 -0.3412 -12.3177 1.2224 55.3122 3.7208 10.8605 4.3030 135.3145
a322 -0.4380 -15.8123 -0.1078 -7.8116 0.2704 6.2884 3.6899 9.4954 -0.0810 -1.2796
a3
13
1.9052 62.2614 -0.5497 -8.6160 0.5439 22.9494 0.8153 15.1825 5.0720 173.1058
a323 1.2343 62.3384 0.5249 30.6959 0.6947 17.9974 0.4917 5.6323 -0.4631 -13.9488
Covariates
Insurancei 0.0529 1.3634 0.0211 0.6394 -0.1311 -2.9795 0.1655 4.2219 0.0858 2.5385
Industryi 0.3895 8.9540 0.0454 0.9458 0.3768 5.5493 0.4560 9.2683 0.0706 1.4379
Manageri 0.0938 2.4947 0.1272 3.4102 -0.0804 -1.8483 0.0408 0.9358 0.0035 0.0895
Reliabilityi 0.3019 4.1470 0.0005 0.0076 0.3562 3.2799 0.7057 7.2528 0.1576 1.9267
Performanceit -0.2689 -19.6277 -0.0870 -10.6098 1.2670 64.6429 -1.4607 -93.0382 -0.3850 -27.1127
Mean lnL -283.259 -247.965 -290.743 -257.910 -300.036
Table 5: Estimation results for the perfect forecast scenario: inflation rate (column 1), short
term interest rate (column 2), short term interest rate (column 3), DAX (column 4), USD/EUR
TX-rate(column 5).
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inflation short term long term DAX USD/EUR
interest rate interest rate




2.8633 78.0191 2.9608 34.1499 2.6968 20.3840 0.0164 0.1116 -8.4136 -75.0544
c13 -2.2461 -50.1362 -4.7365 -162.2089 -5.4109 -55.7825 -1.6734 -12.6294 -4.8502 -84.4983
c2
1
-5.2781 -18.9519 2.2650 16.6667 -4.4995 -9.5897 3.4532 10.3266 4.8241 2.0869
c23 4.1260 60.5874 3.9490 23.5480 4.1796 9.1337 2.7987 8.5326 3.3623 1.4090
c3
1
-0.1956 -6.9362 -4.6996 -106.5669 -1.4709 -15.2425 1.5402 7.8823 -5.2013 -74.3043
c32 -2.1907 -48.8996 -3.4183 -91.3984 -1.1911 -12.1417 -1.2074 -1.4186 2.1779 48.2905
a1
21
-4.0768 -63.6006 -30.9707 -56.4850 -15.1632 -8.5215 1.8376 5.7859 -13.1783 -0.0061
a1
31
3.9774 97.2469 5.5559 209.6566 9.3596 65.5893 5.5448 19.6903 9.1772 93.9324
a1
22
9.3178 1.2477 -4.1347 -12.6560 7.6473 1.0135 2.0809 9.0395 -0.6472 -0.0001
a132 21.2628 2.8512 15.7637 93.6643 2.4513 0.0025 3.3947 16.4074 11.2790 113.1294
a1
23
-3.4514 -64.7542 -9.7899 -11.4878 -4.9675 -26.0898 -1.1440 -6.4306 45.4784 6.4151
a133 -2.1322 -3.7526 36.6687 73.9736 -3.6931 -0.0566 -1.9122 -4.3838 40.3182 5.6841
a2
11
-0.8027 -0.0471 31.0830 1.3828 22.0604 14.5729 -7.8284 -8.8727 25.6128 0.1631
a2
31
-7.2316 -55.1609 -31.6840 -1.3185 -10.1338 -6.5731 -8.3559 -7.8644 -8.6322 -0.0402
a2
12
12.6179 20.4869 -0.8653 -4.8072 10.2979 13.1435 0.2465 0.4235 -17.8566 -0.1926
a232 -27.2339 -11.2124 -18.2751 -8.2865 -3.3662 -4.3057 -1.4596 -2.5589 -6.9552 -2.6100
a2
13
-3.5376 -0.0187 -25.2171 -0.9636 7.9175 14.4744 -9.5520 -1.9901 4.8755 0.2754
a233 -5.6926 -45.2872 15.1311 0.6766 -2.4354 -4.4136 -2.9733 -7.1166 0.9516 0.0519
a3
11
6.7001 83.9612 29.5527 120.4267 8.5309 20.1533 10.9493 16.3033 0.2206 0.0556
a3
21
8.9718 102.6522 31.3908 134.0914 11.0552 24.7708 0.8613 0.0616 -0.9720 -18.1682
a3
12
16.3218 11.4869 0.1667 0.0030 14.2125 8.8568 10.0431 1.1838 10.7679 91.2534
a322 21.2459 14.9157 24.9244 34.2886 11.3041 7.1283 1.3968 0.0079 -0.1777 -1.5629
a3
13
-1.5127 -20.6936 26.4336 109.1846 -3.2266 -3.2533 0.9551 4.2734 9.0057 102.9223
a323 3.8339 58.0894 26.4144 112.6414 4.2386 24.2900 2.0427 2.1347 -2.8484 -33.4712
Covariates
Insurancei -0.0130 -0.1929 -0.0382 -0.5512 -0.0017 -0.0162 0.2473 3.4395 0.3018 4.0894
Industryi 0.0518 0.6174 -0.1987 -1.5807 0.5528 4.4048 0.9237 10.1283 -0.0374 -0.4207
Manageri -0.0769 -1.1210 0.1261 1.5626 0.0619 0.7651 0.1549 1.9657 -0.1706 -2.7296
Reliabilityi 0.0225 0.1623 0.4594 2.7248 -0.2700 -1.3595 1.1797 6.9640 -0.2141 -1.4012
Performanceit -1.5250 -61.9919 -0.5405 -32.1726 -1.5109 -25.4360 -3.4863 -50.8207 -1.9912 -46.8518
Mean lnL -292.948 -254.543 -283.246 -283.274 -284.488
Table 6: Estimation results for the 6 months ahead forecasting scenario: inflation rate (column
1), short term interest rate (column 2), short term interest rate (column 3), DAX (column 4),
USD/EUR FX-rate (column 5).
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